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financing, but are not smaller than compliant control firms. Additional analyses indicate that 
compliance is negatively associated with bad news. 
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The effects of firm size, corporate governance quality, and bad news on 
disclosure compliance 
 
1 Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the roles of firm size, corporate governance quality, and bad news 
in determining compliance with disclosure requirements. The investigation is motivated 
by Sarbanes-Oxley’s mandate to increase efforts to ensure compliance with accounting 
and reporting requirements (KPMG International 2004, 2005), by assertions that small 
businesses lack the accounting skills and resources needed to comply with some 
disclosure requirements (Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Advisory 
Committee on Smaller Public Companies 2006), by continued debate about the value of 
corporate governance to small firms, and by the paucity of research on factors affecting 
disclosure compliance. 
Proponents of scale-based regulation argue that because compliance costs are 
disproportionately higher for small firms, such firms should be exempted from certain 
disclosure requirements.1 The posited higher cost of compliance suggests that small firms 
would be less likely to comply with disclosure requirements regardless of whether the 
news to be provided reflects favorably or unfavorably on the firm and ignores the role 
high quality corporate governance can play. 
                                                 
1 Recommendations made by the Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Firms are reflected in the SEC’s 
(2008) Final Rule: Smaller Reporting  Companies Regulatory Relief and Simplification Act. This 
amendment to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which became effective 
in February 2008, expands the number of firms that qualify for scaled disclosure and streamlines regulation 
by moving scaled disclosure requirements from Regulation S-B into Regulation S-K. It also allows smaller 
reporting firms to comply with scaled financial and nonfinancial disclosure requirements on an item-by-
item basis. 
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To provide evidence on factors that affect disclosure compliance, we examine 
compliance with a straight-forward disclosure requirement: to report the circumstances of 
an auditor change. The setting provides a base case that does not require knowledge of 
any commercial arrangement, estimation of an amount, or judgment of materiality. All 
that is required is that management states the facts concerning the (infrequent) occurrence 
of an auditor change. The disclosures are considered relevant to investors because an 
auditor change raises questions about the reliability of financial statement information 
(Knapp and Elikai 1988). 
In two analyses of compliance with SEC auditor change filing requirements, 
Schwartz and Soo (1995, 1996) focus on compliance with timely filing requirements (i.e., 
do firms file within the allowed time period), not on compliance with requirements that 
specify the content of auditor change filings. At the time of their studies, disclosures 
about the reasons for auditor change were voluntary. Schwartz and Soo’s results indicate 
that late filing of Form 8-K Item 4 (“8-K Item 4”) is negatively associated with firm size 
and positively associated with corporate financial distress. We find that size and financial 
condition have no incremental explanatory power in our study of compliance with 8-K 
Item 4 disclosure content requirements, and there is an association between corporate 
governance quality and disclosure compliance. 
SEC Regulation S-K, Item 304(a) requires that firms report the termination of 
association with an external auditor in 8-K Item 4, including information on client and 
auditor circumstances surrounding the termination. Unlike some required disclosures, 
information about auditor changes omitted from 8-K Item 4 filings will not necessarily 
become publicly available through alternative sources. Evidence of the importance of 8-K 
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Item 4 filings and the negative market reaction to bad news disclosed in them (e.g., 
DeFond et al. 1997; Krishnan and Krishnan 1997; Wells and Louder 1997; Hackenbrack 
and Hogan 2002; Whisenant et al. 2003; Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant 2004) 
provides an alternative (to size) explanation for firm failures in disclosure compliance: 
suppression of bad news.  
We focus our initial analysis on firms’ auditor change disclosures at 128 firms 
that convey bad news. We compare firm size and the quality of corporate governance for 
firms that disclosed (versus failed to disclose) bad news about the circumstances of 
auditor changes. We identify firms’ failures to disclose bad news using SEC staff 
comment letters filed between May 2005 and April 2007.2 We match firms that failed to 
comply with disclosure requirements with firms that have the same types of bad news but 
that complied with disclosure requirements. Our results indicate that, for this sample, 
firms that failed to properly disclose bad news had weaker corporate governance and 
relied less on external financing than those that properly disclosed bad news. Firm size is 
not a significant determinant of bad news disclosure. 
We test the sensitivity of these results by comparing all firms identified from SEC 
comment letters as failing to provide all required auditor change disclosures with a 
sample of fully disclosing firms (N = 161) matched by date of auditor change. The 
comparison includes proxies for firm size, corporate governance, bad news, and control 
variables. Results show that firms that failed to properly disclose bad news have weaker 
corporate governance, are less likely to have a departing Big 4 auditor, are more likely to 
                                                 
2 SEC Comment letters were first posted to the SEC EDGAR website on May 12, 2005. The majority of the 
originally posted letters relate to 8-K Item 4 omissions. 
Ettredge, Michael. (2011) The Effects of Company Size, Corporate Governance Quality, and Bad News on Disclosure Compliance. 
Review of Accounting Studies. Publisher's Official Version: <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11142-011-9153-8>.  
Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/.
 4
have certain types of bad news (lack of board approval for the auditor change and client-
auditor disagreements), and are similar in size to firms that properly disclosed bad news.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, our results do not 
support the contention that firm size per se reduces compliance with straight-forward 
disclosure obligations. Our results suggest that firm compliance is positively associated 
with the quality of corporate governance, and negatively associated with the disclosure of 
certain types of bad news. The positive relation between compliance and corporate 
governance demonstrates the importance of strong corporate governance even in small 
firms. This importance is further supported by our results showing that small firms with 
high quality corporate governance are more likely to disclose bad news. These results 
suggest that governance improvements at small firms would improve compliance with 
disclosure requirements even in the presence of bad news. 
Second, we provide evidence on compliance with mandatory disclosure 
requirements (Schwartz and Soo 1995; Ettredge et al. 2001) using SEC staff objections to 
firm disclosures in comment letters posted on the SEC website. A number of studies 
develop and test explanations for discretionary disclosures (e.g., Healy and Palepu 2001; 
Graham et al. 2005), and with SEC filing deadline compliance (e.g., Schwartz and Soo 
1996; Ettredge et al. 2006).3 Studies of why managers fail to comply with seemingly 
straight-forward disclosure requirements likely are missing because of the lack of 
information about disclosure violations prior to the public release of SEC comment letters 
                                                 
3 Other studies have investigated tax compliance (e.g., Slemrod 1992; Andreoni et al. 1998; Davis et al. 
2003; and Martinez-Vasques and Rider 2005). These studies consider the tax decisions of individuals, not 
corporations. Hammersley et al. (2010) examine firms that fail to comply with requirements to remediate 
previously identified internal control deficiencies. They are more concerned with documenting the 
consequences of noncompliance than the reasons for noncompliance.  
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in 2005. Our results reveal the factors associated with disclosure compliance in one 
context and are a first step to determining ways to increase the rate of compliance. 
Our third contribution relates to the distinction between good (or neutral) news 
and bad news in a disclosure compliance setting. We provide evidence suggesting that 
managers opportunistically omit disclosures that previous research indicates are viewed 
as bad news by investors; that is, managers behave opportunistically in determining how 
to comply with disclosure requirements. These results complement evidence that 
managers behave opportunistically in making discretionary accounting choices (see e.g., 
Healy and Palepu 2001; Kothari et al. 2009). While strategic behavior might be expected 
in discretionary disclosure settings, it is perhaps surprising that managers are willing to 
risk the disapproval of the SEC by partial compliance with 8-K regulation. Thus, our 
results provide justification for continued monitoring of mandatory disclosures, 
especially 8-K Item 4s.  
The next section of the paper describes the SEC staff comment letter database and 
8-K Item 4 disclosure requirements. Section 3 presents our theory, conceptual constructs, 
and expected associations. Section 4 discusses the sample, models and variables. Sections 
5 and 6 report the results. Section 7 discusses limitations, summarizes, and concludes. 
 
2 The SEC comment letter database and Form 8-K Item 4 
 
We identify firms that failed to comply with 8-K Item 4 disclosure requirements using 
SEC staff comment letters that assert that submitted filings do not contain all required 
disclosure items. SEC staff comment letters form one foundation for the SEC’s 
enforcement process by providing incentives for managers and auditors to avoid both 
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unacceptable practices and the violation of accounting principles or disclosure regulations. 
Each year the SEC staff (Divisions of Corporation Finance and Investment Management) 
reviews filed documents (such as registration statements relating to initial public 
offerings, 8-Ks, 10-Qs and 10-Ks), evaluates them for compliance with disclosure 
regulations, and sends comment letters to selected firms,4 typically indicating areas where 
the staff believes disclosure should be improved. Management can respond to a comment 
letter by making the recommended changes, suggesting alternative approaches, or 
presenting an argument that the current disclosure is appropriate. If the registrant’s action 
or argument does not satisfy the SEC staff, the matter may be forwarded to the 
enforcement division.5 
In response to requests for disclosure of staff comment letters under the Freedom 
of Information Act, the SEC announced on June 24, 2004 (SEC 2004) that it planned to 
begin releasing its staff comment letters. The SEC began posting the comment letters at 
its EDGAR web site on May 12, 2005.6 The majority of the letters initially posted relate 
to 8-K Item 4 matters, with particular focus on firms’ failures to explain auditor changes 
or to address omissions in information relating to auditor changes (Martinek 2005).7  
                                                 
4 A 2007 interview with an SEC staff member provided the following information about the comment letter 
process. The staff undertakes several types of reviews: full review, financial statement review (including 
footnotes), and targeted (limited scope) reviews. The subjects of targeted reviews change over time. The 
criteria for selection of filings for review are not made public because doing so might prompt firms to take 
steps to avoid review. The SEC neither confirms nor denies that the SEC staff reviews all 8-K Item 4s that 
are filed. However, we examine 225 8-K Item 4s submitted by control firms that did not receive SEC staff 
comment letters. (See discussions of control samples in Sections 4.1 and 6.2) All contained the required 
disclosures. We are confident that the SEC review process does not result in failure to challenge significant 
numbers of 8-K Item 4s that lack required disclosures.  
5 A May 2007 interview with an SEC staff member indicated that if a registrant does not respond to a 
comment letter, a staff member follows up with a phone call. Historically, non-response has not been a 
problem. Referral to the enforcement division is not common because registrants usually acquiesce to the 
SEC’s suggestions. 
6 Audit Analytics now provides a database of SEC comment letters. 
7 A May 2007 interview with an SEC staff member confirmed that the SEC intentionally posted letters 
dealing with auditor change disclosures first, as a trial effort.  
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Regulation S-K, Item 304(a), requires that 8-K Item 4 filings report the 
termination of association with an external auditor, including information on client and 
auditor circumstances surrounding the change. Prior research documents the importance 
of 8-K Item 4 filings as a whole, and indicates that certain disclosures about the 
circumstances of auditor changes are viewed as bad news by investors (DeFond et al. 
1997; Krishnan and Krishnan 1997; Wells and Loudder 1997; Hackenbrack and Hogan 
2002; Whisenant et al. 2003; Sankaraguruswamy and Whisenant 2004).  
Information about the circumstances of an auditor change omitted from 8-K Item 
4 will not necessarily come to light via other means. Suppose, for example, that an 8-K 
Item 4 states that a firm “no longer is associated with” an auditor when, in fact, the 
auditor resigned. The resignation might become public knowledge if the SEC staff 
noticed that the 8-K Item 4 did not state, as required by Regulation S-K Item 304, 
whether the former accountant resigned, declined to stand for re-election or was 
dismissed, or if the former auditor noticed the omission, and communicated it to the 
client in its letter commenting on the contents of the client’s 8-K Item 4. That letter, 
required by Regulation S-K Item 304(a)(3), should be included by the client in its 8-K 
Item 4 submission to the SEC. However, the auditor might not detect such an error and, if 
it did, the client might fail to include the auditor’s letter with the 8-K Item 4. If the SEC 
staff does not detect omitted information when the initial 8-K Item 4 is filed, there is no 
subsequent event that will with certainty reveal the information to the public.  
3 Theory, constructs, and expected associations 
We posit that firm size, corporate governance quality, and adverse information about an 
auditor change are determinants of full compliance with the requirements of an 8-K Item 
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4 filing. The dependent variable captures whether a client’s 8-K Item 4 contains all 
required information.8 Below, we describe the explanatory constructs and discuss their 
expected effects on disclosure compliance. 
 
Firm Size 
The SEC has expressed concern that smaller registrants lack sufficient qualified 
personnel to deal with disclosure requirements.9 For example, in March 2005, the SEC 
formed an Advisory Committee on Smaller Public Companies, which recommended 
smaller firms not be subject to further acceleration of Form 10-Q and 10-K filing dates, 
“because of the lack of capacity… of internal compliance personnel and external 
professional advisors to smaller public firms” (SEC Advisory Committee on Smaller 
Public Companies 2006). In 2008, the SEC amended Regulation S-K to expand the 
number of firms that qualify for scaled (by size) disclosure requirements (SEC 2008). In 
2010 the Dodd-Frank Act (Public Law No: 111-203) provided smaller (non-accelerated) 
filers with permanent exemption from Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.10 
We expect firm size to be positively associated with 8-K Item 4 disclosure compliance. 
 
Corporate governance quality 
                                                 
8 The primary method for initially identifying non-compliance is firm receipt of an SEC staff comment 
letter. We scrutinize 8-K Item 4s of all non-compliant firms to determine the nature of the information  
omitted. We study the 8-K Item 4s of all matching, compliant firms to ensure that all information items are 
present.  
9 The SEC currently designates firms with less than $75 million public float as smaller registrants. The 
previous threshold was less than $25 million in public common equity and less than $25 million in annual 
revenue. The change in threshold is expected to increase the number of smaller reporting firms to 4,976 
from 3,395, an increase of 47%. Firms without calculable public float are considered small reporting firms 
if the previous year’s revenues were less than $50 million.  
10 Non-accelerated filers are still required to perform their own assessments of internal control and those 
assessments are now subject to liability under securities laws. However, non-accelerated filers need not 
provide an external auditor’s Section 404 internal control assessment (KPMG 2010). 
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Corporate governance is an important determinant of disclosure compliance. The 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO 2004) 
notes that the board of directors is responsible for monitoring firm risk control activities, 
including reporting efforts.11 The audit committee also has a direct role in external 
reporting. Karamanou and Vafaes (2005, 453) state that “empirical evidence is broadly 
consistent with the notion that effective corporate governance is associated with higher 
financial disclosure policy.” Research has established a positive relation between board 
independence and practices consistent with high quality corporate governance 
(Weisenbach 1988, Brickely et al. 1994), and between financial expertise and other audit 
committee characteristics and the effectiveness of monitoring financial reporting (Menon 
and Williams 1994; Abbott et al. 2004; Carcello and Neal 2003; Bedard et al. 2004). We 
use measures of board quality and audit committee quality as proxies for governance 
quality. We expect higher quality board and audit committee governance to be positively 
associated with 8-K Item 4 disclosure compliance. 
 Both Congressional mandate and prevailing business practice hold CFOs 
accountable for the quality of financial information issued by their corporations (Geiger 
and North 2006). Research links CFO quality and internal control quality (Li et al. 2010). 
Because the CFO typically is responsible for initiating non-routine filings (e.g., Forms 8-
K) as well as routine filings (e.g. Forms 10-K and 10-Q), we expect CFOs with more 
experience to be positively associated with 8-K Item 4 disclosure compliance.12  
                                                 
11 The enterprise risk management process, as defined by COSO, is designed to achieve (among other 
objectives) “the reliability of the entity’s reporting including both internal and external reporting of 
financial and non-financial information” (2004, 124).  
12 COSO (2004, 87) states that the CFO “influences the design, implementation, and monitoring of the 
firm’s reporting systems.” According to Deloitte & Touche’s CFO Management Framework (D&T 2006), 
the CFO’s finance department should “prepare accurate, validated reporting to meet statutory, SEC, and 
shareholder needs in a timely fashion.” 
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Size of external auditor 
The identity of the departing external auditor also can affect disclosure compliance. 
There is substantial evidence that audits by larger (Big 4) firms are of higher quality (see 
Francis 2004 for a review). The largest accounting firms should have greater knowledge 
of disclosure and filing requirements regarding auditor changes, and we expect these 
audit firms to share such knowledge with their clients (Ettredge et al. 2001). Thus, we 
expect the existence of a departing Big 4 auditor (compared to a departing non-Big 4 
auditor) to be positively associated with 8-K Item 4 disclosure compliance.  
 
Bad news in 8-K Item 4 
Regulation S-K, Subpart 229.304,  requires that 8-K Item 4s disclose the termination of 
association with an external auditor, including information that would be considered bad 
news: (1) whether the former auditor was dismissed, resigned, or declined to stand for re-
election, (2) whether the audit report for either of the past two years contained an adverse 
opinion or a disclaimer of opinion, or was qualified or modified as to uncertainty, audit 
scope, or accounting principles; including the nature of each such adverse opinion, 
disclaimer of opinion, modification, or qualification, (3) whether the board of directors 
approved the decision to change auditors, (4) whether there were any disagreements with 
the former auditor, (5) whether there were any “reportable events”, (6) whether the client 
consulted with a new auditor regarding application of accounting principles to a specified 
transaction, or regarding the type of audit opinion the client might receive, or about any 
disagreement or reportable event, and/or (7) whether the client provided the former 
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auditor with a copy of the disclosures it intended to make in 8-K Item 4. Items (6) and (7) 
occur very infrequently (bad news omission of such events occurs less than one percent 
of the time), so we do not code these disclosures as bad news. 
Previous research analyzes market responses to auditor change disclosures. For 
example, Schwartz and Soo’s (1995) analysis of auditor changes suggests that reporting 
delays may reflect management’s attempt to suppress the negative information revealed 
by auditor changes. A number of studies report negative market reactions to SEC-
mandated disclosures about the circumstances of auditor changes. Wells and Loudder 
(1997) document a negative price reaction to disclosures of auditor resignation. A 
negative price reaction may reflect the market’s perception that auditor resignation is 
associated with litigation risk, and is viewed as a warning signal about the quality of the 
firm’s financial reporting (Krishnan and Krishnan 1997). Disclosures of reportable events 
indicating problems with financial statement reliability are also associated with negative 
stock price reactions, while those related only to internal control events are not 
(Whisenant et al. 2003). Smith (1988) provides additional evidence of negative market 
reaction to auditor change bad news. Managers with knowledge of adverse circumstances 
associated with auditor changes have disincentives to disclose that information. We 
therefore expect bad news to be negatively associated with 8-K Item 4 disclosure 
compliance. If failure to comply with mandatory disclosure requirements in 8-K Item 4 is 
due to innocuous mistakes, rather than opportunistic omissions, the information omitted 
from 8-K Item 4s should be random rather than disproportionately adverse.13 
                                                 
13 A 2006 SEC study of restatements of financial reports found that the majority of errors restated arise 
from mistakes. The Deputy Chief Accountant of the SEC stated, “Internal-control structures are missing 
things, corporate-finance staffs are missing things and auditors are missing things” (Reilly 2006). If these 
factors also are causing 8-K Item 4 errors, our corporate governance quality variables should be positively 
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4 Samples, models and variables  
 
 
4.1 Test Sample 
 
The test sample includes firms failing to comply with 8-K Item 4 disclosure requirements 
disclosed in SEC staff comment letters14 posted on the EDGAR web site from May 2005 
through April 2007 (486 comment letters issued to 418 firms on 8-K Item 4 issues). Table 
1 Panel A describes the disposition of the sample. We delete 134 comment letters that 
addressed minor matters other than non-disclosure of required information,15 78 firms 
without ticker symbols, and 45 with missing data, resulting in 161 test firms. We use this 
sample for tests in Section 6. Of those test firms, 97 received comment letters for failing 
to disclose neutral information (e.g., failure to disclose an auditor dismissal or failure to 
disclose board approval for the auditor change). Deleting these 97 firms leaves 64 test 
firms that omitted bad news. We match those 64 test firms with 64 control firms that also 
reported auditor changes via Form 8-K, but that did not receive SEC comment letters. We 
use this sample of 128 firms for tests in Section 5 to investigate the effect of firm size, 
corporate governance, and control variables when bad news circumstances exist. We 
match each test firm with a control firm that had the same bad news conditions, but that 
                                                                                                                                                 
associated with full disclosure, but bad news auditor-change circumstances should have no explanatory 
power. 
14 In some cases, the SEC posted firms’ response letters at the web site without posting the SEC comment 
letters that provoked the responses. We include such firms in the sample since the contents of the comment 
letters are evident from the responses. 
15Several examples illustrate the nature of these types of matters. Many such examples concern essentially 
clerical errors, e.g., “your initial filing of the Item 4.01 Form 8-K did not contain the printed name and title 
of the person signing the report or the date of the report. Please file an amendment to the Form 8-K 
including this information”, and “We read that you appointed Danziger & Hochman as your new 
accountants. Please revise your filing to refer to this firm by the complete name under which they have 
registered with the PCAOB.” Other examples seek clarification, e.g., “Please clarify what you mean by ‘or 
any later period’ as the statement is vague. The interim period should be specified as the interim period 
through [date of resignation, declination or dismissal].” 
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properly disclosed the bad news and therefore did not receive a comment letter from the 
SEC. Table 1 Panel B provides information on industry distribution by SIC codes for the 
sample. The test sample is concentrated in three industries: manufacturing; finance, 
insurance, and real estate; and services. 
     
[Insert Table 1 about Here] 
 
4.2 Overview of analyses 
 
Our primary analysis uses 128 test and control firms to estimate versions of the following 
model: 
 
FULDISC  =    a0 + a1SIZE + b1GOV1 + b2GOV2 …  
 
+ bjGOVj + AUDITOR + CONTROLS.  (1) 
 
We present definitions and data sources in Table 2. The dependent variable, FULDISC, 
equals one for control firms that disclosed all required items in the auditor-change 8-K 
Item 4 and equals zero for test firms that received SEC comment letters. SIZE proxies for 
firm size. GOV1 through GOVj are proxies for corporate governance quality. We also 
estimate a second model in which we replace all governance proxies with a summary 
governance index, GOV. Both models also include the size of the departing auditor (Big 4 
or other), plus control variables. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about Here] 
 
4.3 Explanatory variable definitions 
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This section describes our measures of bad news items, firm size, corporate governance 
quality, departing auditor size, and controls. To measure bad news, we determine the 
client’s actual information state, and code an associated dichotomous variable. For 
control firms, the actual information state is described in the initial 8-K Item 4 disclosure. 
For test firms, we determine the actual information state by reading corrected 8-K Item 
4s (8-K/A Item 4s). RESIGN equals one if the former auditor resigned the engagement or 
declined to continue providing service to the client, and zero otherwise. NOAPPROV 
equals one if the decision to change auditors was not approved by the board of directors, 
and zero otherwise. DISAGREE equals one if there were any disagreements with the 
former auditor, and zero otherwise. EVENT equals one if there were any “reportable 
events,” and zero otherwise.16 PRIORGC equals one if the last audit report before the 
auditor change included a going concern audit opinion, and zero otherwise. In addition to 
the individual bad news proxies we use BAD as a summary measure in sensitivity tests 
reported in Sections 6.2 and 6.3. BAD equals one if any of the five auditor change bad 
news variables is coded as equal to one, and zero otherwise. Thus, BAD measures the 
presence of bad news, regardless of type. We expect that each of the bad news variables 
will be negatively associated with disclosure compliance. 
Our proxy for firm size is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity, 
LNMV.  As a robustness check we use a dichotomous variable, LARGE, which equals one 
for firms with market value of equity greater than $75 million and zero otherwise. We 
employ this dichotomous variable because the SEC views $75 million as a meaningful 
                                                 
16 Under Item 304 of Regulation S-K, reportable events include: (1) the auditor advised the client that 
internal controls are inadequate, (2) the auditor is unwilling to rely on management’s representations, or to 
be associated with the financial statements, (3) the auditor advised the client of the need to expand the 
scope of the audit, and/or (4) the auditor advised the client that information has come to light that 
materially affects the fairness or reliability of a prior audit report or of the current financial statements. 
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regulatory break-point in public firm size. We expect that size is positively associated 
with disclosure compliance. 
Our proxies for corporate governance quality fall into three categories: (1) board 
of directors, (2) audit committee, and (3) chief financial officer (CFO). BODINDPCT is 
the number of independent board of directors divided by the total number of board 
members.17 BODMEET is the number of board meetings annually. We expect both of 
these variables to be positively associated with disclosure compliance. CEOCHAIR 
equals one if the client’s CEO also serves as chairman of the board, and zero otherwise. 
We expect this variable to be negatively associated with disclosure compliance.18  
Regarding audit committee characteristics, AUDCOM equals one if the firm has 
an audit committee, and equals zero otherwise.19 ACMEET equals the number of audit 
committee meetings held annually. FINEXPRT is equal to the number of financial experts 
on the audit committee, as defined by the SEC and as designated by the firm. We expect 
each of these variables to be positively associated with disclosure compliance.  
Regarding CFO characteristics, we measure CFO experience as the number of 
years the CFO has held that position, CFOTENURE, and expect greater experience to be 
positively associated with disclosure compliance. CFOBOD is equal to one if the CFO is 
on the board and to zero otherwise. We anticipate that CFOBOD will be negatively 
associated with disclosure compliance because the CFO’s presence may make the board 
less independent of management with regard to reporting and disclosure. Finally, given 
                                                 
17 We determine director independence based on firm classifications provided in proxy statements. 
18 This expectation is consistent with the negative association between CEO duality and the high quality 
governance practice of managerial turnover following restatements (Desai et al. 2006). 
19 We code audit committee existence rather than percentage of independent audit committee members 
because our sample includes firms with shares quoted on the OTCBB and Pink Sheets, which are not 
subject to exchange listing requirements and have not voluntarily created audit committees.  
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the role of CFOs in managing the internal control environment, we include the variable 
INTCONMW, which equals one if the firm reports an internal control material weakness 
(under SOX Section 404), and zero otherwise.20 We expect that the presence of an 
internal control material weakness will be negatively associated with disclosure 
compliance. 
We use GOV as a summary measure in an alternative version of model (1). GOV 
is derived from the nine governance indicator variables. We add one to the value of GOV 
if the value of BODINDPCT, BODMEET, ACMEET, FINEXPRT or CFOTENURE is 
larger than the sample median, respectively. We add one to the value of GOV if 
CEOCHAIR equals zero, if CFOBOD equals zero, if AUDCOM equals one, and if 
INTCONMW equals zero, respectively. We expect that higher quality corporate 
governance as indicated by GOV will be positively associated with disclosure compliance.  
We measure the effect of the external audit firm using BIG4DEPART, which 
equals one if the firm is audited by a Big 4 audit firm prior to the auditor change, and 
zero otherwise. We expect that departing Big 4 auditors are more likely than other audit 
firms to remind their clients to make complete 8-K Item 4 filings, and are more likely to 
ensure that the clients follow through. Thus, BIG4DEPART should be positively 
associated with disclosure compliance.  
 
4.4 Control variables 
 
We use two control variables to capture managers’ incentives and ability to 
comply with mandatory disclosure requirements. The first captures firm plans to raise 
                                                 
20 For smaller firms not subject to SOX Section 404, we use internal control information reported under 
SOX Section 302.  
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capital externally, EXTFIN. It is computed following Bradshaw et al. (2006) as the sum 
of equity financing and debt financing in the subsequent fiscal year, scaled by total assets. 
Because firms subject to greater scrutiny by investors and regulators have more 
incentives to invest in governance infrastructure, and greater incentives to comply, we 
expect a positive association between external financing and disclosure compliance. The 
second control variable measures firms’ financial health. Financially distressed firms 
likely have less ability to comply with disclosure requirements because they devote their 
scarce monetary resources and managerial attention to restoring profitability. In fact, 
those approaching bankruptcy experience more reporting problems (Schwartz and Soo 
1995). We proxy for financial health based on ranked Altman’s Z scores. Those in the 
lowest decile of Z scores (i.e., having the highest bankruptcy risk) are assigned 10 for 
BKRPTRANK. Clients in the next highest decile are assigned 9, and so on down to the 
highest Z score decile, coded 1. We expect BKRPTRANK to be negatively associated 
with disclosure compliance. 
 
5 Results for firms matched on bad news 
 
Table 3 provides comparisons of the 64 test and 64 control firms. Since we compare 
matched samples, paired t-tests are conducted. Test firms have smaller average market 
value of equity (p = 0.058); the two groups contain a similar proportion of firms that have 
market value of equity exceeding $75 million (p = 0.139). Test firm boards meet less 
frequently (p = 0.000) and are more likely to have CEOs as the board chair (p = 0.020). 
Test firms are less likely to have audit committees (p = 0.000), have audit committees 
that meet less frequently (p = 0.000), and are less likely to have financial experts (p = 
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0.017) compared to control firms. Test firms have less experienced CFOs (p = 0.098) and 
CFOs of test firms are more likely to serve on firms’ boards of directors (p = 0.030), 
suggesting weaker board independence. Tests of the summary governance index show 
that test firms have significantly lower quality corporate governance than test firms (p = 
0.000). Finally, test firms are less likely to have a departing Big 4 auditor (p = 0.008). 
The two groups are similar in terms of percent of independent board members, 
BODINDPCT, in terms of internal control material weakness, INTCONMW, and in the 
control variables, EXTFIN and BKRPTRANK.  
[Insert Table 3 about Here] 
 Table 4 reports pairwise correlations, showing that FULDISC is not highly 
correlated with LNMV, but is significantly positively associated with BODMEET, 
AUDCOM, ACMEET, FINEXPRT, BIG4DEPART and CFOTENURE (only for Spearman 
correlation) and significantly negatively associated with CEOCHAIR and CFOBOD.  
LNMV is significantly associated with all variables except CEOCHAIR, CFOTENURE, 
and EXFIN.  Correlations range from 0.169 (INTCONMW) to 0.515 (ACMEET), 
suggesting that size is a noisy corporate governance quality proxy. 
[Insert Table 4 about Here] 
 Table 5 presents the results of estimating model (1) using the sample of 128 test 
and matching control firms. LNMV is not significant (p = 0.192). Size is marginally 
significant (p = 0.093) when LNMV is replaced with LARGE.  Consistent with 
expectations, disclosure compliance is positively associated with board meeting 
frequency (BODMEET, p = 0.060), the presence of an audit committee (AUDCOM, p = 
0.041), more frequent audit committee meetings (ACMEET, p = 0.066), and CFOs with 
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longer tenure (CFOTENURE, p = 0.064). Also consistent with expectations, disclosure 
compliance is negatively associated with weak internal controls over financial reporting 
(INTCONMW, p = 0.095). Among control variables, disclosure compliance is positively 
associated with external financing (EXTFIN, p = 0.047).  
[Insert Table 5 about Here] 
Table 5 also presents the results of estimating model (2), in which we replace the 
individual governance variables with a summary variable, GOV. LNMV is insignificant. 
Size becomes significant and negative when LNMV is replaced with LARGE (not 
tabulated).  Further, disclosure compliance is positively associated with higher quality 
corporate governance (GOV, p = 0.001); the summary measure yields the same inferences 
as individual components. In summary, given bad news auditor change circumstances, 
the disclosure of that bad news in 8-K Item 4 filings is more likely for firms with higher 
quality corporate governance and reliance on external financing. Size is not associated 
with disclosure compliance in the presence of variables that capture corporate governance 
quality.  
 
6 Additional Analyses 
 
6.1 Within-test-sample evidence on omission of bad news 
The results of within-sample tests of association (χ2) between specific types of bad news 
and their disclosure are mixed.21 Firms disproportionately fail to disclose some types of 
                                                 
21 Tabled results of within sample tests will be provided upon request.22 This sample includes the 64 
analyzed in section 5, plus an additional 97 that omitted required items from 8-K Item 4s, but whose 
omitted information did not constitute bad news. 
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bad news (NOAPPROVE, EVENT, PRIORGC) but not other bad news (RESIGN, 
DISAGREE). 
 
6.2 Alternative matched control sample evidence 
In this section, we conduct supplementary tests using an expanded test sample that 
includes all 161 firms that failed to provide required 8-K Item 4 disclosures.22 We choose 
161 new control firms not matched on bad news circumstances, and we add explanatory 
variables representing types of bad news events. The matching sample of 161 control 
firms both changed auditors and provided all required 8-K Item 4 disclosures. We match 
each test firm with the control firm whose auditor change occurred closest in time to its 
own, to control for time-varying environmental factors that might affect auditor change 
decisions. The matching process is not intended to control for test versus control firm 
characteristics such as firm size or bad news.  
[Insert Table 6 about Here] 
 
Columns (a) and (b) of Table 6 present descriptive statistics for the 161 test firms 
and the 161 matched control firms. Column ‘(a)-(b)’ presents tests of differences in 
means or proportions. All p-values are based on paired t-tests. The results show that test 
firms are smaller (p = 0.015 and p = 0.030, respectively), and have weaker governance: 
fewer board meetings (p = 0.003), more CEOs serving as chairs of the board (p = 0.001), 
less likely to have audit committees (p = 0.000), fewer audit committee meetings (p = 
0.001), fewer financial experts on the boards (p = 0.005), more CFOs on the boards (p = 
0.055) and weaker internal controls over financial reporting (p = 0.002). Test firms are 
                                                 
22 This sample includes the 64 analyzed in section 5, plus an additional 97 that omitted required items from 
8-K Item 4s, but whose omitted information did not constitute bad news. 
Ettredge, Michael. (2011) The Effects of Company Size, Corporate Governance Quality, and Bad News on Disclosure Compliance. 
Review of Accounting Studies. Publisher's Official Version: <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11142-011-9153-8>.  
Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/.
 21
also less likely to have departing Big 4 auditors (p = 0.000), and more likely to have bad 
news circumstances: auditor resignation (p = 0.000), lack of board approval of the auditor 
change (p = 0.000), more disagreement (p = 0.058), and prior going concern opinions 
(0.000). Test firms are in better financial condition than control firms. 
 Table 7 reports results for two models estimated with the 322 test and control 
firms described in Table 6. The first model includes all individual variables measuring 
corporate governance quality and bad news (the “component variables model”), and the 
second includes summary corporate governance and bad news variables (the “summary 
variables model”).  
The results concerning firm size and corporate governance quality for these two 
models are consistent with the results in Table 5: size (LNMV or LARGE untabulated) is 
not associated with compliance in the presence of variables that capture corporate 
governance quality. Results in the component variables model show that disclosure 
compliance is positively associated with the presence of an audit committee (AUDCOM, 
p = 0.018), and negatively associated with the CEO serving as chair of the board 
(CEOCHAIR, p = 0.032) and internal control material weakness (INTCONMW, p = 
0.092). The summary variables model reveals a positive association between disclosure 
compliance and corporate governance quality (GOV, p = 0.017). The results for both 
models regarding bad news are consistent with within-test-sample evidence; disclosure 
compliance is negatively associated with NOAPPROV (p = 0.000) and PRIORGC (p = 
0.024) in the component variables model, and negatively associated with BAD (p = 0.000) 
in the summary variables model. The results of these supplemental analyses using an 
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alternative sample and matching procedure yield the same inferences as our analysis of 
firms matched on bad news. 
[Insert Table 7 about Here] 
 
 
7 Limitations, summary, and conclusions 
 
This study assesses the incremental effects of firm size, corporate governance quality, 
and bad news on disclosure compliance on 8-K Item 4 filings. It is motivated by recent 
regulatory changes and calls for size-based disclosure regulation suggesting that firm size 
is an important determinant of ability to comply with accounting and disclosure 
requirements. To provide evidence on the factors that affect disclosure compliance, we 
investigate compliance with the straight-forward requirement that SEC registrants 
disclose information about the circumstances surrounding an auditor change. The 
disclosures require no computations or complex judgments but are non-routine and may 
require disclosure of information that previous research indicates is viewed as value-
decreasing. Our inferences regarding the lack of explanatory power of size in the 
presence of variables capturing corporate governance quality may not necessarily apply 
to other disclosure settings that do not have this characteristic. Future research could 
study whether size represents ability to comply in other more complex mandatory 
disclosure contexts.  
Non-compliance related to firm size and corporate governance quality in the 
absence of bad news could occur because small firms lack some combination of qualified 
personnel and internal controls needed to ensure compliance. Although not complex, the 
auditor change disclosure requirements could be viewed as challenging for small firms if 
Ettredge, Michael. (2011) The Effects of Company Size, Corporate Governance Quality, and Bad News on Disclosure Compliance. 
Review of Accounting Studies. Publisher's Official Version: <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11142-011-9153-8>.  
Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/.
 23
their personnel are not familiar with reporting requirements for infrequent events, 
particularly if they are served by small audit firms less familiar with non-routine SEC 
filing requirements.  
We model compliance with auditor change disclosure requirements as a function 
of firm size, corporate governance quality, and whether the disclosure includes bad news 
that might not otherwise become public. We compare test firms that did not comply with 
the SEC’s disclosure requirements in their 8-K Item 4 filings to several samples of 
control firms. We collect information about compliance from SEC staff comment letters 
first made public in 2005.   
Our main results and sensitivity tests indicate that firm size is not a significant 
determinant of compliance with auditor change disclosure requirements in the presence 
of variables that capture corporate governance quality. We believe these findings call into 
question the advisability of using firm size as the sole criterion for the imposition of or 
exemption from firm disclosure requirements. While an arbitrary size-cutoff provides 
registrants with a rule for determining applicable disclosure requirements, our results 
suggest that other firm characteristics would better distinguish firms that are likely to 
violate disclosure requirements.  
Specifically, our results highlight the association between corporate governance 
and disclosure compliance. We find that features of the board of directors, the audit 
committee, and CFOs, and the strength of internal controls all are significantly associated 
with disclosure compliance. We find that more active boards and audit committees that 
meet frequently encourage disclosure compliance. We also find a positive association 
between disclosure compliance and both the number of financial experts on the audit 
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committee and the tenure of the CFO. Thus, our results highlight the role of financial 
expertise and experience in assuring disclosure compliance. Finally, our results provide 
evidence consistent with opportunistic non-compliance in that we find that omissions of 
bad news are more common than omissions of good news or neutral news, particularly in 
situations involving failure to obtain board approval of auditor changes and 
disagreements with the prior audit firm.  
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Table 1 Sample disposition and industry breakdown 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel A: Sample disposition 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Initial sample of test firms receiving comment letters from the SEC 
 
418 
     Delete: firms receiving letters citing minor issues (134) 
     Delete: firms without ticker symbols (78) 
     Delete: firms with missing data (45) 
Test firms receiving SEC comment letters (Section 6 analyses) 161 
     Delete: test firms that failed to disclose non-bad-news items (97) 
Test firms that failed to disclose bad news items 64 
 
     Add: Control firms disclosing bad news 64 
 
Sample size for Section 5 analyses 
 
128 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Panel B: Industry distribution by SIC codes 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
SIC 
Codes 
 
N
 
          % 
  01-09 Agric., Forestry, Fishing 0 0.00 
  10-14 Mining 6 4.69 
  15-17 Construction 1 0.78 
  20-39 Manufacturing 65 50.78 
  40-49 Transport., Communications 6 4.69 
  50-51 Wholesale Trade 2 1.56 
  52-59 Retail Trade 2 1.56 
  60-69 Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 18 14.06 
  70-89 Service 27 21.09 
  99 Others 1 0.78 
 Total 128 100.00 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 2 Variable definitions and data sources 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variable 
 
Construct or proxy type
 
Data source
 
Dependent variable
FULDISC = 1 if firm disclosed all required items in its auditor-change 
8-K Item 4; 0 otherwise. 
 
SEC, Edgar
Proxies for bad news
RESIGN = 1 if firm’s auditor resigned; 0 otherwise. 8-K or 8-K/A
NOAPPROV = 1 if firm’s board did not approve the change; 0 otherwise. 8-K or 8-K/A
DISAGREE = 1 if firm had any disagreements with its auditor; 0 
otherwise. 
8-K or 8-K/A
EVENT = 1 if firm had any ‘reportable events’; 0 otherwise. 8-K or 8-K/A
PRIORGC = 1 if firm received a ‘going concern’ opinion in the prior 
two years; 0 otherwise. 
8-K or 8-K/A
BAD = 1 if any of the five auditor change bad news variables are 
coded 1; 0 otherwise. The bad news variables are RESIGN, 
NOAPPROV, DISAGREE, EVENT, PRIORGC. This is a 
summary variable capturing any kind of bad news.
8-K or 8-K/A
 
Proxies for firm size
LNMV = natural log of market value of equity at end of fiscal year 
when 8-K was issued.
Compustat 
LARGE = 1 if firm’s market value of equity exceeds $75 million; 0 
otherwise.  
Compustat 
 
Proxies for corporate governance quality
Board of Directors 
BODINDPCT = percent of members of firm’s board of directors who are 
described as independent in proxy statements. 
DEF14A 
BODMEET = number of meetings held annually by board of directors. DEF14A 
CEOCHAIR = 1 if CEO is the chairman of board of directors; 0 
otherwise. 
DEF14A 
Audit committee 
AUDCOM = 1 if firm’s board of directors has an audit committee; 0 
otherwise.  
DEF14A 
ACMEET = number of meetings held annually by audit committee. DEF14A 
FINEXPRT = number of financial experts on the audit committee or the 
board; 0 otherwise.
DEF14A 
Chief financial officer (CFO) 
CFOTENURE = number of years CFO has held that position. DEF14A  
CFOBOD = 1 if CFO is a director; 0 otherwise. DEF14A 
INTCONMW = 1 if firm reported internal control material weakness 
under SOX Section 404 or 302; 0 otherwise.
AuditAnalytics
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Table 2 continued 
 
Summary measure of corporate governance quality 
GOV = the sum of nine indicator variables related to governance. 
Add one if the value of BODINDPCT, BODMEET, 
ACMEET, FINEXPRT or CFOTENURE is larger than 
sample median, respectively; add one if CEOCHAIR = 0, 
CFOBOD = 0, AUDCOM =1 and INTCONMW = 0 
respectively. This is a summary variable capturing various 
aspects of governance.
 
 
External auditor class 
BIG4DEPART = 1 if firm’s departing auditor is Big 4; 0 otherwise. 8-K 
 
 Control variables  
EXTFIN = the sum of equity financing and debt financing, scaled by 
total assets. Equity financing equals sales of common and 
preferred stock minus purchases of common and preferred 
stock  and cash dividends; debt financing equals long-term 
debt issued  minus long-term debt reduction minus change in 
current debt. It is measured in the fiscal year after the auditor 
change. 
Compustat 
 
BKRPTRANK = the decile rank of the client’s Altman’s Z score. Clients in 
the decile having the highest bankruptcy risk are assigned a 
value of ‘10’ and so on down to ‘1’ for the lowest risk decile.  
Compustat
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics for variables used in the section 5 logit model explaining 
disclosure compliance, using 64 test firms and 64 matching control firms 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 Mean
(or proportion equal to 1)
Paired t-test 
one-tailed p-value
    
Construct 
VARIABLE 
Test Firms
(FULDISC = 0)
Control Firms
(FULDISC = 1)
 
 N = 64 N = 64  
Size 
LNMV 3.888 4.456           0.058* 
LARGE 0.422 0.516           0.139 
Governance  
BODINDPCT 0.648 0.666           0.280 
BODMEET 5.047 8.297 0.000***
CEOCHAIR 0.672 0.484           0.020** 
AUDCOM 0.719 0.953 0.000***
ACMEET 4.609 7.516 0.000***
FINEXPRT 0.797 1.063           0.017** 
CFOTENURE 3.750 4.609           0.098* 
CFOBOD 0.250 0.125           0.030** 
INTCONMW 0.313 0.234           0.230 
GOV  4.762 6.032           0.000***
External Auditor Class    
BIG4DEPART 0.406 0.609           0.008***
Controls 
EXTFIN 0.141 0.343           0.150 
BKRPTRANK 3.719 3.859           0.877 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
This table presents descriptive statistics for explanatory variables for 64 test firms that failed to 
disclose bad news conditions, and for 64 control firms that disclosed bad news. 
 
***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively. All p-values are 
one-tailed for coefficients having the expected signs, and are two-tailed otherwise. 
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Table 4 Correlations 
Variable 
FULDI
SC LNMV 
BODIN
DPCT 
BODM
EET 
CEOC
HAIR 
AUDC
OM 
ACME
ET 
FINEX
PRT 
CFOTE
NURE 
CFOB
OD 
INTCO
NMW 
BIG4D
EPART EXFIN 
BKRPT
RANK GOV 
FULDISC  0.133 0.042 0.331 -0.190 0.316 0.279 0.184 0.103 -0.160 -0.088 0.203 0.095 0.025 0.330 
  (0.135) (0.638) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (0.001) (0.037) (0.246) (0.071) (0.325) (0.021) (0.287) (0.783) (0.000) 
LNMV 0.110  0.367 0.400 -0.020 0.386 0.515 0.300 0.067 -0.223 0.169 0.195 -0.140 0.459 0.487 
 (0.218)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.821) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.451) (0.011) (0.056) (0.028) (0.115) (0.000) (0.000) 
BODINDPCT -0.032 0.378  0.232 0.029 0.247 0.291 0.279 -0.012 -0.175 0.196 0.276 -0.096 0.187 0.453 
 (0.718) (0.000)  (0.008) (0.743) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.896) (0.048) (0.027) (0.002) (0.281) (0.035) (0.000) 
BODMEET 0.353 0.400 0.256  -0.215 0.491 0.497 0.321 0.072 -0.111 0.105 0.342 -0.124 0.082 0.624 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)  (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.421) (0.213) (0.236) (0.000) (0.164) (0.357) (0.000) 
CEOCHAIR -0.190 -0.070 0.056 -0.214  -0.165 -0.069 -0.061 0.227 0.086 0.063 -0.113 -0.052 0.009 -0.291 
 (0.032) (0.432) (0.532) (0.015)  (0.063) (0.441) (0.491) (0.010) (0.334) (0.482) (0.203) (0.558) (0.920) (0.001) 
AUDCOM 0.316 0.404 0.207 0.524 -0.165  0.454 0.367 0.044 -0.220 0.082 0.197 -0.151 0.196 0.626 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.000) (0.063)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.618) (0.013) (0.355) (0.026) (0.088) (0.026) (0.000) 
ACMEET 0.291 0.602 0.312 0.613 -0.132 0.546  0.326 -0.003 -0.225 0.134 0.189 -0.177 0.277 0.600 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.138) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.973) (0.011) (0.132) (0.033) (0.045) (0.002) (0.000) 
FINEXPRT 0.179 0.324 0.309 0.353 -0.041 0.406 0.453  -0.006 -0.287 0.011 0.251 -0.075 0.247 0.544 
 (0.043) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.646) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.945) (0.001) (0.900) (0.004) (0.399) (0.005) (0.000) 
CFOTENURE 0.223 0.055 0.079 0.188 0.205 0.114 0.123 0.065  0.075 -0.026 0.031 -0.040 0.008 0.204 
 (0.012) (0.534) (0.377) (0.034) (0.020) (0.200) (0.166) (0.466)  (0.397) (0.767) (0.726) (0.655) (0.925) (0.021) 
CFOBOD -0.160 -0.289 -0.219 -0.141 0.086 -0.220 -0.242 -0.305 0.011  0.020 -0.088 0.038 -0.112 -0.505 
 (0.071) (0.001) (0.013) (0.112) (0.334) (0.013) (0.006) (0.000) (0.903)  (0.826) (0.326) (0.668) (0.209) (0.000) 
INTCONMW -0.088 0.181 0.212 0.110 0.063 0.082 0.089 0.029 -0.052 0.020  0.043 -0.061 0.137 -0.116 
 (0.325) (0.040) (0.016) (0.214) (0.482) (0.355) (0.320) (0.749) (0.559) (0.826)  (0.630) (0.493) (0.122) (0.193) 
BIG4DEPART 0.203 0.180 0.289 0.331 -0.113 0.197 0.249 0.278 0.086 -0.088 0.043  0.058 -0.051 0.318 
 (0.021) (0.042) (0.001) (0.000) (0.203) (0.026) (0.005) (0.001) (0.333) (0.326) (0.630)  (0.516) (0.569) (0.000) 
EXFIN 0.008 -0.203 -0.196 -0.123 0.035 -0.243 -0.264 -0.138 -0.161 0.132 0.018 -0.070  -0.275 -0.168 
 (0.928) (0.021) (0.027) (0.168) (0.692) (0.006) (0.003) (0.120) (0.070) (0.139) (0.840) (0.431)  (0.002) (0.057) 
BKRPTRANK 0.031 0.544 0.221 0.095 0.016 0.210 0.279 0.225 0.044 -0.109 0.144 -0.052 -0.291  0.177 
 (0.727) (0.000) (0.012) (0.288) (0.854) (0.017) (0.001) (0.011) (0.621) (0.221) (0.105) (0.563) (0.001)  (0.046) 
GOV 0.306 0.513 0.465 0.659 -0.283 0.547 0.724 0.573 0.337 -0.478 -0.124 0.282 -0.316 0.204  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.163) (0.001) (0.000) (0.021)   
Top triangle presents Pearson correlations, and bottom triangle presents Spearman correlations. All p-values are in parenthesis and are two-tailed.
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Table 5 Logistic regression results explaining full disclosure of bad news in 8-K Item 4 
filings 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
The dependent variable is FULDISC, which equals one if the firm disclosed all required items in 
its auditor-change 8-K Item 4; zero otherwise. The models test the association between FULDISC 
and variables measuring firm size, corporate governance quality, external auditor class, and 
controls. See Table 2 for variable definitions. Models are estimated using a sample of 64 test 
firms that failed to disclose bad news conditions in 8-K Item 4s, and 64 control firms that 
experienced the same bad news conditions, but disclosed them. The samples are restricted to 
firms having bad news to disclose, the dependent variable FULDISC captures disclosure of bad 
news when it is coded as one. Data in the table represent the un-standardized regression 
coefficients and p-values of Wald Chi-squares. All p-values are one-tailed for coefficients having 
the expected signs, and are two-tailed otherwise. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively. 
  Model (1) Model (2) 
 Predicted Sign Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
Intercept  -1.637 0.057* -2.502  0.000***
LNMV + -0.110     0.192 -0.052     0.324
BODINDPCT + -0.818     0.248   
BODMEET + 0.087 0.060*   
CEOCHAIR - -0.553     0.104   
AUDCOM + 1.467   0.041**   
ACMEET + 0.080     0.066*   
FINEXPRT + 0.064     0.422   
CFOTENURE + 0.081 0.064*   
CFOBOD - -0.613     0.153   
INTCONMW - -0.621 0.095*   
GOV +   0.418 0.001***
BIG4DEPART + 0.517     0.121 0.446    0.130
EXTFIN + 0.410   0.047** 0.363    0.068*
BKRPTRANK - 0.030     0.365 0.025    0.375
      
Number of observations  128  128  
Model Chi square p-value  0.000  0.001  
R-square  0.237  0.142  
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Table 6 Descriptive statistics for variables used in section 6 logit models explaining full 
disclosure, using 161 test firms and two samples of control firms  
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Mean (or proportion equal to 1) Paired t-test 
one-tailed p-value 
 Test Firms
(a) 
Matched Firms
(b) 
 
(a)-(b)
 
N = 161
 
N = 161 
 
Size   
LNMV 3.770 4.285 0.015**
LARGE 0.382 0.485 0.030** 
Governance    
BODINDPCT 0.636 0.667 0.104
BODMEET 5.448 6.952 0.003*** 
CEOCHAIR 0.630 0.455 0.001*** 
AUDCOM 0.721 0.903 0.000*** 
ACMEET 4.733 6.515 0.001*** 
FINEXPRT 0.879 1.103 0.005*** 
CFOTENURE 3.885 4.200 0.260
CFOBOD 0.255 0.182 0.055*
INTCONMW 0.273 0.145 0.002*** 
GOV  4.885 5.861 0.000*** 
External Auditor Class    
BIG4DEPART 0.436 0.648 0.000*** 
Bad News    
RESIGN 0.448 0.132 0.000*** 
NOAPPROV 0.412 0.031 0.000*** 
DISAGREE 0.061 0.025 0.058*
EVENT 0.212 0.181 0.243
PRIORGC 0.370 0.175 0.000*** 
BAD 0.648 0.297 0.000*** 
Controls   
EXTFIN -0.383 0.111 0.169
BKRPTRANK 4.018 4.545 0.056*
__________________________________________________________________________ 
This table presents descriptive statistics for explanatory variables for 161 test firms that failed to 
disclose all required information in 8-K Item 4s and for 161 matching control firms.  
 
 ***, **, and * represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively. P-values are 
two-tailed. See Table 2 for variable definitions.  
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Table 7 Logistic regression results explaining disclosure compliance in 8-K Item 4 
filings using supplemental matching procedures 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
  Component Variables Model 
Summary Variables 
Model 
 Predicted Sign Coeff.  p-value Coeff.  p-value 
Intercept  0.976 0.074 -0.259 0.277 
LNMV + -0.013 0.441 -0.037 0.310 
BODINDPCT + -1.186 0.067*   
BODMEET + 0.008 0.402   
CEOCHAIR - -0.506 0.032**   
AUDCOM + 0.860 0.018**   
ACMEET + 0.014 0.362   
FINEXPRT + -0.045 0.414   
CFOTENURE + -0.002 0.475   
CFOBOD - -0.202 0.292   
INTCONMW - -0.455 0.092*   
GOV +    0.168 0.017** 
BIG4DEPART + 0.233 0.254 0.250 0.196 
RESIGN - -0.435 0.124   
NOAPPROV - -2.594 0.000***   
DISAGREE - -0.326 0.328   
EVENT - -0.226 0.271   
PRIORGC - -0.702 0.024**   
BAD -   -1.279 0.000*** 
EXTFIN + -0.001 0.492 0.013 0.381 
BKRPTRANK - 0.020 0.347 0.029 0.256 
Number of 
observations 
  
322  
  
322 
Model Chi square p-
value 
  
0.000  
  
0.000 
R-square  0.280   0.140 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
The dependent variable is FULDISC, which equals one if the firm disclosed all required items in 
its auditor-change 8-K Item 4; zero otherwise. The models test the association between FULDISC 
and variables measuring firm size, corporate governance quality, departing auditor class, and 
controls. See Table 2 for variable definitions. The components variable model employs all 
available proxies for quality of governance and bad news as explanatory variables. The summary 
variables model replaces the bad news and governance proxies with summary variables BAD and 
GOV. Models are estimated using a sample of 161 test firms that failed to disclose required 
information in 8-K Item 4s, and 161 matching control firms that changed auditors on 
approximately the same dates, but disclosed all required items. Data in the table represent the un-
standardized regression coefficients and p-values of Wald Chi-squares. All p-values are one-
tailed for coefficients having the expected signs, and are two-tailed otherwise. ***, **, and * 
represent significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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